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Entrepreneurial activity is a key driver of job creation, and entrepreneurs and their financiers are 
especially sensitive to capital gains taxes.  As a result, a cut in the capital gains tax rate should be 
expected to stimulate job creation to some degree.  We measure the magnitude of this effect by examining 
the treatment of capital gains across the 50 states over roughly the past 40 years.  Our results suggest that 
a complete elimination of the taxation of capital gains realized by Ohio taxpayers would lead to the 
creation of 40,000 new jobs.  Applying this estimate to proposals currently under discussion suggests a 
somewhat smaller effect. 2 
 
Introduction 
Few would dispute the notion that entrepreneurship is a key to economic growth (See, for 
example, Baumol, Litan and Schramm (2007)) and there is a substantial body of theory and evidence, 
summarized in Gentry (2010), that links entrepreneurial activity to the taxation of capital gains.  
Researchers have documented a variety of ways in which reductions in capital gains tax rates make it 
easier for entrepreneurs to conduct business, whether the reductions mitigate the asymmetric taxing of 
profits as opposed to losses (Gentry (2010)), lower the cost of capital obtained through initial public 
offerings (Guenter and Willenborg (1999)) or reduce distortions associated with firms remaining privately 
held to avoid taxes (Calvacanti and Erosa (2007)). 
Given the strong link between capital gains taxation and entrepreneurial behavior, policy makers 
have often reduced capital gains tax rates to spur economic activity, in particular investment and job 
creation.  Unfortunately, the literature has not kept pace with policy, offering little guidance on the 
magnitude of gains in investment or employment that might be expected from a cut in capital gains tax 
rates.  We partially fill this void by providing empirical evidence on the change in employment that might 
be expected from a reduction in capital gains tax rates. By exploiting the difference in capital gains tax 
rates across the fifty states, as well as the fact that nearly a dozen states changed their tax rates on capital 
gains during the last decade, we are able to come up with a robust estimate regarding the effects of capital 
gains tax rates on job creation. We find conclusive evidence that high capital gains taxes reduce job 
creation, and estimate that Ohio’s proposed legislation that would eliminate the tax entirely for most of 
the state’s taxpayers would be expected to create roughly 40,000 jobs.   
I.  Capital Gains Taxation and Economic Activity 
Following the changes in the federal taxation of capital gains during the 1980s, much empirical 
academic work focused on the relationship between capital gains tax rates and revenues.  That literature is 
nicely summarized by Bogart and Gentry (1995) who find, in agreement with most other authors, that 
reductions in capital gains tax rates do not lead to increases in capital gains tax revenues.  Their work is 3 
 
important in that they are the first to use variations in the tax treatment of capital gains across states to 
help identify the effects of changes in capital gains tax rates. 
  Other authors have made use of the variation in states’ treatment of capital gains to answer 
broader questions regarding the effect of capital gains rate cuts on economic activity.  Gompers and 
Lerner (1998) find that entrepreneurial activity is sensitive to the taxation of capital gains.  In particular, 
they find that a reduction in capital gains tax rates is associated with an increase in venture capital funding 
in a state – consistent with the hypothesis that a lower capital gains tax rate encourages entrepreneurs to 
obtain venture capital funding to start their businesses.  Gentry (2010) updates and confirms these 
findings.  
  It does appear that the tax treatment of capital gains is an important factor in entrepreneurial 
activity.  Gentry and Hubbard (2003) find that asymmetries in taxation are important considerations in 
whether individuals become self-employed or actively manage a business.  Cullen and Gordon (2007) 
argue that cutting the capital gains tax rate would encourage entrepreneurial activity.  Finally, Gentry 
(2010) uses the Federal Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Finance dataset to document the 
importance of actively managed business assets in household portfolios.  Previous work based on IRS 
data on capital gains realizations, for example Auerbach (2007), gave the impression that entrepreneurial 
assets are a small part of the capital gains tax base.  Gentry (2010 page 14) documents that this in fact is 
not the case, since “Total unrealized capital gains on active business assets are almost six times larger 
than the total unrealized capital gains on directly-held stock.”  Clearly, there is scope for tax policy to 
influence entrepreneurial decision making. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there are no attempts of which we are aware to relate changes in the 
taxation of capital gains to job creation.  We take two approaches in an initial effort to understand capital 
gains taxation and employment.  First, we construct a careful statistical exercise that takes advantages of 
state variation in the treatment of capital gains, a la Bogart and Gentry (1995), Gompers and Lerner 
(1998) and Gentry (2010), to identify the effect of a cut in the capital gains tax rate on employment.  
Second, as an informal cross-check, we simply compare employment in states that offer preferential 4 
 
treatment for capital gains to those that do not.  Both methods yield consistent results suggesting that a 
reduction in capital gains tax rates will boost employment. 
II. Formal Regression Analysis 
To conduct our formal analysis we need a measure of the capital gains tax rate by state for a 
number of years.  There are two “gold standard” datasets available for this purpose.  The first makes use 
of the work of Bakija (2009) while the second is taken from the TAXSIM model hosted at the National 
Bureau of Economic Research and described in Feenberg and Coutts (1993).  Bakija calculates the 
combined federal and state capital gains tax rate faced by a taxpayer with income greater than 200,000 
constant 2007 dollars for each state for every year from 1969 through 2007.  The data from TAXSIM is 
an update of the method used by Gompers and Lerner (1998) to calculate the combined capital gains tax 
rate from 1978 through 2009 based on taxpayers with more than 500,000 in constant dollars of income.
1    
For the years of overlap, the two methods report capital gains tax rates that are quite similar, differing on 
average by less than 0.63 percentage points.   
To the two tax rate variables we also add variables measuring private employment by state from 
1969 through 2009 and total population by state from 1969 through 2009.  Table 1 presents summary 
statistics for the dataset.  Private employment in the 50 states and the District of Columbia averages a bit 
more than 2.1 million in our sample.  As measured by the TAXSIM data, combined state and federal 
capital gains tax rates range from a low of 15.35 percent in the nine states that did not tax income in 2008 
and 2009 to a high of 39.20 percent in New York in 1977.   
Our regression specification is given by equation (1) 
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where  represents the change in the variable from the preceding year, i indexes the i
th state and t
indexes the t
th year and  t Y is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in year t and 0 otherwise.  That is, in 
                                                           
1 Details on this TAXSIM calculation are available at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/. 5 
 
this specification the change in private employment in a state for a given year is driven by changes in 
population in that state and year, changes in the capital gains tax rate in that state and year, and 
unspecified U.S. economy-wide developments in that year.  The coefficient of interest is  2  , where a 
negative value would indicate that a cut in the capital gains tax rate would increase private employment.  
We use a difference specification to avoid any problems with non-stationary variables and we allowed for 
up to three lags on each of the variables before arriving at this preferred specification.  The log-linear 
specification is standard in the literature in part as it offers a natural interpretation of how a percentage 
point change in the capital gains tax rate translates into a percentage change in the variable of interest, in 
our case employment.  We do not include many control variables as the main point of the regression is not 
to provide a complete explanation of the evolution of private employment but rather to focus on the effect 
of the capital gains tax rate on employment.  The absence of control variables is only problematic if an 
omitted variable happens to be highly correlated with the changes in the capital gains tax rate.  Given the 
inclusion of dummy variables for each year and a choice as to the treatment of the individual state effects, 
the i s , we do not think the estimate for  2  is likely to suffer from omitted variables bias. 
  When estimating equation (1), we must decide how to treat the term  i s .  In a fixed effects 
estimation, this term captures the unique, time-invariant features of state i, for example its geography, its 
history of policies and regulation and so on.   In a random effects estimation  i s  is treated as part of a 
composite error-term along with  , it   - a random perturbation that is shared by all years observed for a 
given state.  Finally, in a pooled Ordinary Least Squares estimation,  i s  is ignored.  Fixed effects 
estimation estimates each state’s  i s in order to control for possible correlation between  i s and the capital 
gains tax rate in state i that might bias the estimate of  2  .  Random effects estimation accounts for the 
correlation across time in a state’s error term, treating  i s as an unknown random perturbation that cannot 
be estimated but that is shared in common across all years for a given state. 6 
 
  The top panel of Table 2 presents estimates for  2   from equation 1 across all three treatments 
and using both the Bajika and TAXSIM tax rates.  In all cases, standard errors are calculated using 
methods that are robust to clustering by state.  As can be seen, the estimate of  2  is remarkably consistent 
regardless of the estimation method or capital gain tax rates used.  Statistical significance is largest for the 
Bakija given its longer sample.  The uniformity of results is reassuring, providing a measure of 
confidence in the findings.  The bottom panel of Table 2 then translates these estimated coefficients on 
capital gains tax rates into estimated numbers of new jobs created in Ohio if the state tax on capital gains 
were completely eliminated, that is dropped from the current 5.9 percent to 0.0 percent.  These estimates 
are determined by the log-linear specification in equation (1).  We envision the capital gains rate falling 
by 5.9 percentage points, multiply this decrease by the estimated  2  coefficient, and then translate the 
effect from the change in the natural logarithm of employment to the change in employment.  Reading 
across the last row in the bottom panel of Table 2 we arrive at the conclusion that exempting capital gains 
from the Ohio income tax would likely increase private employment in Ohio by somewhere in the 
neighborhood of 40,000 jobs.  Given current private employment in Ohio of over 5.5 million, this 
amounts to a 0.7 percent increase in private employment.  
III.  Informal Numerical Analysis 
  As a cross-check on the formal econometric analysis, we also compare the evolution of private 
employment over the past 20 years in states with preferential capital gains treatment to those states with 
no preferential treatment, excluding those states that do not tax income.  That is, we split the income-
taxing states and the District of Columbia into groups based on whether or not they taxed capital gains as 
regular income or gave them special breaks and then averaged normalized employment (1990 = 100) for 
the two groups in each year.    As can be seen in Figure 1, private employment has grown much more 
rapidly in the nine states providing preferential capital gains treatment [AR, HI, MT, NM, ND, RI, SC, 
VT, and WI] than in the other 33 income-taxing states.  Ohio’s employment history is also shown; 
unfortunately it lags behind both the state averages.  Obviously, this informal method does not offer the 7 
 
controls or the measures of statistical reliability as in our formal method, but it does provide a nice cross-
check or reality check to our employment estimate.  The statistical work would have little credibility had 
it been the case that private employment grew more slowly in states that provided capital gains 
preferences. 
IV. Calibrating to Current Proposals 
  The estimates shown in Table 2 are predicated on the complete elimination of the taxation of 
capital gains in Ohio.  However, policy proposals currently under discussion are more complicated, 
involving limits on the size of the capital gain that is exempt from taxes as well as restrictions on the uses 
to which the capital gains realization are put.  These subtleties make it even more difficult to estimate the 
impact of the changes on private employment in Ohio.  Tabulations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer 
Finance presented in Gentry (2010) show that the mean unrealized capital gain for households with active 
business assets (his definition of entrepreneurs) amounts to roughly $730,000 with a median unrealized 
gain of $45,000.  This large discrepancy between the mean and median values suggests some very large 
unrealized capital gains, likely well above the proposed $10 million threshold.
2  While home bias in 
portfolios may be commonplace across international borders, it is unlikely that investors have much of a 
home bias across state borders.  This suggests that the restrictions on the use to which the realized capital 
gains may be put will also likely bind.  Clearly any prudent approach would trim the employment effects 
found in Table 2.   
   
                                                           
2 Unfortunately, Gentry (2010) does not provide any data on the distribution of the unrealized capital gains. 8 
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  Observations  Average  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
State Private Employment  2091  2169092  2489562  72272  18013866 
State Population  2091  4928771  5456232  296000  36961664 
Combined State and Federal 
Capital Gains Tax Rate 
(TAXSIM) 
1683  26.03  5.78  15.35  39.20 
Combined State and Federal  
Capital Gains Tax Rate 
(Bakija) 
1989  25.25  5.19  17.05  36.84 
 
Table 2 
Estimation Results and Job Estimate 
  Bakija Tax Rates  TAXSIM Tax Rates 
  Fixed  Random  Pooled  Fixed  Random  Pooled 
  Effects  Effects  OLS  Effects  Effects  OLS 
Coefficient  -0.00128  -0.00127  -0.00130  -0.00115  -0.00104  -0.00103 
t-Statistic  -1.90  -1.79  -1.73  -1.37  -1.23  -1.16 
Significance Level  6.4%  7.4%  8.4%  17.7%  21.7%  24.7% 
Observations  1938  1938  1938  1581  1581  1581 
             
Change in Ohio Tax Rate  -5.9  -5.9  -5.9  -5.9  -5.9  -5.9 
Percentage Change in Private 
Employment 
0.76%  0.75%  0.77%  0.68%  0.62%  0.61% 
New Jobs  41998  41639  42722  37631  34130  33785 
 
 
 
 